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UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES-ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr-"PER SE" NATURE 
OF SECTION 2 (e)-The Federal Trade Commission, finding that a manufac-
turer and seller of dress patterns discriminated between competing pur-
chasers in violation of section 2 (e) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the 
Robinson-Patman Act,1 by paying transportation costs and donating storage 
cabinets and monthly catalogues to its large variety store customers while 
charging its smaller fabric store customers for the same services and facili-
ties, issued a cease and desist order against these practices. The commission 
held that neither the absence of competitive injury nor the presence of cost 
justification are available as defenses to section 2 (e).2 On petition for re-
1 Section 2 (e) reads: "It shall be unlawful for any person to discriminate in favor of 
one purchaser against another purchaser or purchasers of a commodity bought for resale, 
with or without processing, by contracting to furnish or furnishing, or by contributing to 
the furnishing of, any services or facilities connected with the processing, handling, sale, 
or offering for sale of such commodity so purchased upon terms not accorded to all pur-
chasers on proportionally equal terms." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (e). 
2 These defenses were undoubtedly suggested by §2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act 
which reads in part: "That it shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, ••• 
either directly or indirectly, to discriminate in price betlveen different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality, ••• where the effect of such discrimination may 
be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, 
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view, the court of appeals remanded the case to allow the defendant to 
submit a defense of cost justification.3 On certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court, held, reversed in part. Neither absence of competitive 
injury nor the presence of cost justification constitute a defense to a prima-
facie violation of section 2 (e).4 Federal Trade Commission v. Simplicity 
Pattern Co., 360 U.S. 55 (1959). 
By this decision the Court has committed itself to hold virtually every 
prima-facie violation of section 2 (e) illegal "per se."5 The decision is in 
accord with the previous holdings and dicta of lower courts that section 
2 (e) violations were not subject to the defenses of cost justification6 or 
absence of competitive injury.7 The lower court in the principal case 
sought to avoid these prior decisions by arguing that the main clause of 
section 2 (b), which places the burden of justification on a prima-facie section 
2 (e) violator, would be meaningless if the violator could not use cost 
justification as a defense.8 Although the legislative history of section 2 (b) 
or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition with any person .••• Provided, That nothing 
herein contained shall prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences 
in the cost of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quan-
tities in which such commodities are to such purchasers sold or delivered .•.• " 49 Stat. 
1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (a). 
a Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, (D.C. Cir. 1958) 258 F. (2d) 673, cert. granted 358 
U.S. 897 (1958); comments, 68 YALE L. REv. 808 (1959), 26 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 128 (1958); 
notes, 28 FORD. L. REv. 144 (1959), 72 HARv. L. REv. 385 (1958), 42 MARQ. L. REv. 262 (1958). 
4 In all probability §2 (d) of the Robinson-Patman Act, which prohibits sellers from 
making discriminatory payments to competing purchasers for services or facilities furnished 
by the latter, will receive the same interpretation as §2 (e), since past cases have inter-
preted them in the same light although their language differs somewhat. See, e.g., Eliza-
beth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., (8th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 988; United Cigar-
Whelan Stores Corp. v. H. Weinreich Co., (S.D. N.Y. 1952) 107 F. Supp. 89. 
5 "Per se" violations, in antitrust cases, are those practices which the courts conclusively 
presume are illegal or unreasonable, sans defenses. For a recent case discussing the un-
reasonable "per se" doctrine under the antitrust laws, see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale 
Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959); note, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1244 (1959). The only defense 
that remains is found in the proviso of §2 (b) which states: "That nothing herein con-
tained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case thus made by showing that •.• 
the furnishing of services or facilities ..• was made in good faith to meet •.. the services 
or facilities furnished by a competitor." 49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U.S.C. (1958) §13 (b). 
6 Great Atlantic &: Pacific Tea Co. v. FTC, (3d Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 667. This was 
a §2 (c) case with dicta that cost justification could not be a defense to §2 (e). 
7 Southgate Brokerage Co. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1945) 150 F. (2d) 607 (dictum as to 
competitive injury); Oliver Bros., Inc. v. FTC, (4th Cir. 1939) 102 F. (2d) 763 (dictum as 
to competitive injury); Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 132; Corn 
Products Refining Co. v. FTC, (7th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 211, affd. on other grounds 324 
U.S. 726 (1945). In the two cases which squarely hold that competitive injury need not 
be shown in a §2 (e) violation, the courts did not discuss the legislative history of the 
section, assuming that §2 (e) was meant to be unqualified since §2 (a) justifications were 
not specifically set out in §2 (e). 
s Simplicity Pattern Co. v. FTC, note 3 supra, at 679. The main clause of §2 (b) reads: 
"Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this section, that there 
has been discrimination in .•• services or facilities furnished, the burden of rebutting the 
prima-facie case thus made by showing justification shall be upon the person charged." 
49 Stat. 1526 (1936), 15 U .S.C. (1958) §13 (b). Emphasis added. 
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is sparse, the Supreme Court seems correct in rejecting this argument on 
the ground that section 2 (b) was intended to be procedural, having no 
substantive content.9 But by annexing to their holding a footnote stating 
that the competitive injury and cost-differential defenses found in section 
2 (a) cannot be read directly into section 2 (e),10 the Court apparently dis-
regards its earlier pronouncement that it has a "duty to reconcile [interpre-
tations of the Robinson-Patman Act], except where Congress has told us 
not to, with the broader antitrust policies that have been laid down by 
Congress."11 The Court did not cite any convincing legislative history 
showing congressional intent that section 2 (e) was to be interpreted as a 
"per se" statute;12 indeed there is some evidence that the sponsors of the 
Robinson-Patman Act intended that all the sections be construed in har-
mony with section 2 (a)13 which prohibits direct or indirect price discrim-
ination only where the effect may injure competition or cannot be cost 
justified. The main purpose of section 2 (e) was to stop sellers from indirect 
price discrimination through discriminatory furnishing of advertising serv-
ices.14 But the principal case precludes any argument that section 2 (e) is 
a specific instance of the "indirect" price discriminations prohibited by 
section 2 (a) and therefore that section 2 (a) justifications should be avail-
able as section 2 (e) defenses15 in order to effectuate basic antitrust philoso-
9 This section was referred to during debates as a "procedural" or "burden of proof" 
provision. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 8110, 8231, 9414, 9418 (1936). Cf. Automatic Canteen 
Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). For like interpretations of §2 (b), see AUSTIN, PRICE DIS-
CRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr, rev. ed., 83 (1959); 
comment, 68 YALE L. REv. 808 (1959). 
10 Principal case at 71, note 18. 
11 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, note 9 supra, at 74 (holding that a prima-facie 
case was not established under §2 (f) of the Robinson-Patman Act until proved that the 
buyer was aware that the price concession he was receiving was an illegal discrimination). 
12 For arguments that §2 (e) should not be interpreted as a "per se" section, see REPORT 
OF THE A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMrrrEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 191 
(1955); AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN 
Acr, rev. ed., 122 (1959); Oppenheim, "Should the Robinson-Patman Act be Amended?" 
CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 145 (1948). 
13 "There is nothing in it to penalize, shackle, or discourage efficiency, or to reward 
inefficiency •••• [None of the] physical economies that are to be found in mass buying 
and distribution ••• are in the remotest degree disturbed by this bill •••• It is the design 
and intent of this bill to strengthen existing antitrust laws, prevent unfair-price discrim-
inations, and preserve competition in interstate commerce." H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d 
sess., p. 17 (1936). 
14 See 80 CONG. REc. 7759 (1936), where Mr. Patman said, "Large manufacturers have 
been coerced into giving certain large mass buyers great reductions in prices under the 
, guise of advertising allowances. This bill will not prohibit advertising allowances but it 
will prohibit advertising allowances to be used as a guise for price reductions. • • ." See 
also, H. Rep. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 15-16 (1936); H. Rep. 2966, 84th Cong., 2d sess., 
p. 97 (1956); 80 CoNG. REc. 3114, 6282 (1936). 
15 For authorities advocating this interpretation of §2 (e), see, generally, Oppenheim, 
"Federal Antitrust Legislation: Guideposts to a Revised National Antitrust Policy," 50 
MICH. L. REv. 1139 at 1206-1207 (1952); Rowe, "How To Comply with Sections 2 (c)- (f)," 
CCH 1957 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM; REPORT OF THE A'ITORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL 
COMMrrrEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAws 191-193 (1955). 
1959] RECENT DECISIONS 301 
phy of maintaining but not sterilizing competition.1 6 Since the economic 
effects of direct price discrimination and indirect price discrimination 
(through the furnishing of services or facilities) are basically the same, it 
seems that they should be treated alike where Congress has not clearly 
indicated differential treatment.17 
As a result of the principal case the only avenue left for using a standard 
of reasonableness, rather than a "per se" approach, in applying section 2 (e) 
is to follow the Court's suggestion that the commission has recognized that 
the services rendered need not be exactly the same for every customer to be 
on "proportionally equal terms" within the meaning of section 2 (e).18 If 
the Federal Trade Commission and the courts will take a liberal view of 
what are "proportionally equal terms," perhaps some amount of cost 
justification could be brought into the determination of section 2 (e) viola-
tions.19 However, folloW!ng this decision that section 2 (e) discriminations 
cannot be justified by lack of competitive injury or cost differentials, it 
seems improbable that the commission and courts will interpret the "pro-
portionally equal terms" clause as a means of reconciling section 2 (e) with 
the interpretation of section 2 (a). Hence a legislative amendment to the 
Robinson-Patman Act seems to be the only solution left to effectuate such 
a reconciliation. 
Charles R. Sharp, S.Ed. 
16 "The heart of our national' economic policy long has been faith in the value of 
competition. In the Sherman and Clayton Acts, as well as in the Robinson-Patman Act, 
'Congress was dealing with competition, which it sought to protect, and monopoly, which 
it sought to prevent.' ••• Congress did not seek by the Robinson-Patman Act ••• to 
abolish competition ••• .'' Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231 at 248-249 (1951) (hold· 
ing that meeting competition is a defense to §2 (a) although competition is injured). 
17 In the past the courts and the commission have not hesitated in reading §2 (a) 
phrases into §§2 (e) or 2 (d). See, e.g., Elizabeth Arden, Inc. v. FTC, note 7 supra ["engaged 
in commerce" and "in the course of such commerce" read into §2 (e)]; Golf Ball Mfgrs. 
Assn., 26 F.T.C. 824 (1938) and Atlanta Trading Corp. v. FTC, (2d Cir. 1958) 258 F. 
(2d) 365 [commodities of "like grade and quality" read into §2 (d)]. 
18 Principal case at 61, note 4. Apart from services and facilities furnished only to 
variety stores, Simplicity also furnished some services and facilities to the fabric stores 
which the variety stores did not make use of, although they were available to them. The 
Court intimated this might have constituted "proportionally equal terms," but since it 
had not been argued that Simplicity was thereby treating its customers on "proportionally 
equal terms" the Court did not pass on the question. 
19 The FTC has indicated it would take a broad view of proportional equality in 
Lever Brothers Co., 50 F.T.C. 494 (1953), where in regard to §2 (d) it said a "plan pro-
viding payment for promotional services and facilities •.• must be honest in its purpose 
and fair and reasonable in its application." See also Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 50 F.T.C. 
525 (1953); Procter &: Gamble Distributing Co., 50 F.T.C. 513 (1953); Cosmetic and Toilet 
Preparations Industry Rules, 3 CCH TRADE R.Ec:. REP. 1]20,221 (1954). On the difficulties 
of the clause "proportionally equal terms," see, generally, AusnN, PRICE D1sCRIMINATION 
AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr, rev. ed., 146 (1959); Layton, 
"Demonstrators on Proportionally Equal Terms," CCH ROBINSON-PATMAN Acr SYMPOSIUM 
38 (1948). 
